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Pricing Multi-Interval Dispatch under Uncertainty
Part I: Dispatch-Following Incentives
Ye Guo, Senior Member, IEEE, Cong Chen, Student Member, IEEE, and Lang Tong, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Pricing multi-interval economic dispatch of electric
power under operational uncertainty is considered in this two-
part paper. Part I investigates dispatch-following incentives
of profit-maximizing generators and shows that, under mild
conditions, no uniform-pricing scheme for the rolling-window
economic dispatch provides dispatch-following incentives that
avoid discriminative out-of-the-market uplifts. A nonuniform
pricing mechanism, referred to as the temporal locational
marginal pricing (TLMP), is proposed. As an extension of
the standard locational marginal pricing (LMP), TLMP takes
into account both generation and ramping-induced opportunity
costs. It eliminates the need for the out-of-the-market uplifts by
satisfying a set of strong equilibrium conditions that guarantee
full dispatch-following incentives regardless of the accuracy
of the demand forecasts used in the dispatch. Part II of the
paper extends the theoretical results developed in Part I to
more general network settings. It investigates a broader set of
performance measures, including the incentives of the truthful
revelation of ramping limits, revenue adequacy of the operator,
consumer payments, generator profits, and price volatility.
Part II also includes an empirical study of the performance
of several benchmark mechanisms under the rolling-window
dispatch model with demand forecast errors.
Index Terms—Multi-interval economic dispatch, look-ahead
dispatch, Locational marginal pricing, general and partial
equilibrium, and dispatch-following incentives.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of pricing multi-interval look-
ahead economic dispatch when generators are ramp-limited
and demand forecasts inaccurate. This work is motivated
by recent discussions among system operators on the need
for ramping products in response to the “duck-curve” effect
of renewable integrations [3]–[8]. A well-designed multi-
interval look-ahead dispatch that anticipates trends of future
demand can minimize the use of expensive reserves.
A standard implementation of a look-ahead dispatch is
the so-called rolling-window dispatch, where the operator
optimizes the dispatch over a few scheduling intervals into
the future based on load forecasts. The dispatch for the
immediate scheduling interval (a.k.a. the binding interval) is
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implemented while the dispatch for the subsequent intervals
serves as an advisory signal and is updated sequentially.
In pricing rolling-window dispatch, a common practice
is the rolling-window version of the multi-interval loca-
tional marginal pricing (LMP). Based on the principle of
marginal cost pricing, LMP is a uniform pricing mechanism
across generators and demands at the same location in the
same scheduling interval. When implemented over the entire
scheduling period with a perfect demand forecast, LMP has
remarkable properties. LMP supports an efficient market
equilibrium such that a profit-maximizing generator has no
incentive to deviate from the central dispatch. LMP guar-
antees a nonnegative merchandising surplus for the system
operator. As a uniform pricing scheme, LMP is transparent
to all market participants, and the price can be computed
easily as a by-product of the underlying economic dispatch.
Most of the attractive features of LMP are lost, un-
fortunately, when the rolling-window version of LMP (R-
LMP) is used and demand forecasts inaccurate. Indeed, even
if perfect forecasts are used in R-LMP, none of the nice
properties are guaranteed. In particular, a missing-money
scenario arises when a generator is asked to hold back
its generation in order to provide ramping support for the
system to meet demands in future intervals. In doing so, the
generator incurs an opportunity cost and may be paid below
its best offer to generate. Expecting compensations for the
opportunity costs in future intervals, the generator disappoints
when the anticipated higher payments do not realize due to
changing demand forecasts. Therefore, a generator may not
be payments above the minimum payment defined by its offer
under R-LMP. Examples of such scenarios are well known
and also illustrated in Example 2 in Sec V. It turns out that
such examples are not isolated instances; they occur to all
uniform pricing schemes. (See Sec. III Theorem 2.)
To ensure that generators are adequately compensated, the
operator provides the so-called uplift payments to genera-
tors suffering from underpayments in an out-of-the-market
settlement. The roles of such uplifts have been discussed
extensively in the literature [9]–[12]. Such settlements are
typically discriminative and often subject to manipulation.
They may lead to a negative merchandising surplus that has
to be socialized among consumers.
2A. Related work
The dispatch-following incentive issues with pricing multi-
interval dispatch have been widely discussed in the literature
[1], [4], [8], [12]–[15] although a formal way of analyzing
such issues is lacking.
Several marginal cost pricing schemes have been pro-
posed for the rolling-window dispatch policies. The flexible
ramping product (FRP) [5] treats ramping as a product to
be procured and priced uniformly as part of the real-time
dispatch. FRP is a two-part tariff consisting of prices of
energy and ramping. Ela and O’Malley proposed the cross-
interval marginal price (CIMP) in [13] defined by the sum
of marginal costs with respect to the demands in the binding
and the future (advisory) intervals. Multi-settlement pricing
schemes are proposed in [15], [16] that generalize the existing
two-settlement day-ahead and real-time markets.
Deviating from marginal cost pricing are two recent pro-
posals aimed at minimizing the out-of-the-market payments;
both employ separate pricing optimizations that are differ-
ent from those used in the economic dispatch. The price-
preserving multi-interval pricing (PMP), initially suggested
by Hogan in [17] and formalized in [14], adds to the objective
function the loss-of-opportunity cost for the generators for
the realized prices and dispatch decisions. In contrast, the
constraint-preserving multi-interval pricing (CMP) proposed
in [14] fixes the past dispatch decisions and penalizes ramp-
ing violations. Both have shown improvements over the
standard rolling-window LMP policy.
All existing pricing schemes for multi-interval economic
dispatch are based on uniform pricing mechanisms. To our
best knowledge, no existing pricing policies can provide
dispatch-following incentives that eliminate discriminative
out-of-the-market settlements.
B. Summary of results, contexts, and limitations
The main contribution of this work is threefold. First,
we analyze dispatch-following incentives for generators. For
the multi-interval dispatch model, one can treat the genera-
tion/consumption in different scheduling intervals as separate
(but dependent) markets. Two types of market equilibrium
models are considered. We borrow the notion of the general
equilibrium model that considers all markets jointly and
the partial equilibrium model that focuses on one market
with fixed prices and productions in all others. Under the
general equilibrium model, a generator has no incentive to
deviate from its dispatch, given the equilibrium prices for all
scheduling intervals. Under the partial equilibrium model,
on the other hand, a generator has no incentive to deviate
from the dispatch signal for the next scheduling interval,
independent of prices in other scheduling intervals.
When load forecasts are perfect and the scheduling of
all intervals are set simultaneously in an one-shot economic
dispatch, the multi-interval economic dispatch and LMP form
a general equilibrium. Consequently, no generator would
deviate from the dispatch no matter how unfavorable the
price in a particular interval may appear. The dispatch and
LMP in an interval, however, do not necessarily form a
partial equilibrium. When demand forecasts are imperfect or
when rolling-window dispatch and pricing policies are used,
a generator facing unfavorable prices in a particular interval
has incentives to deviate from the central dispatch signals.
Second, we introduce the notion of strong equilibrium that
captures the dispatch-following incentive conditions under
arbitrary load forecast errors. A dispatch and pricing policies
form a strong equilibrium if they are simultaneously a general
equilibrium and a partial equilibrium for all scheduling
intervals. The strong equilibrium conditions guarantee that
there is no incentive for a generator not to follow the dispatch
even when demand forecasts are not accurate.
We begin with a negative result in Theorem 2: under
mild conditions, no uniform pricing mechanism guarantees
dispatch-following incentives under the rolling-window dis-
patch model. This result means that, if out-of-the-market
uplifts are used to ensure dispatch-following incentives under
uniform pricing, discriminative payments are unavoidable.
Next, we generalize LMP to nonuniform pricing and refer
the generalization to as temporal locational marginal pricing
(TLMP). TLMP prices the generation of a generator i based
on its contribution to meeting the demand in interval t. In
doing so, TLMP encapsulates both generation and ramping-
induced opportunity costs in each scheduling interval.
As shown in Proposition 2, TLMP decomposes into energy
and ramping prices:
piTLMPit = pi
LMP
t + µit − µi(t−1), (1)
where piLMPt is the standard LMP, and the second term is the
increment of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
ramping constraints in the economic dispatch optimization,
from µi(t−1) in interval (t−1) to µt in interval t. The above
decomposition is entirely analogous to the energy-congestion
price decomposition of LMP. TLMP naturally reduces to
LMP in the absence of binding ramping constraints.
Among the most important properties of TLMP is that it
satisfies the strong equilibrium conditions regardless of the
accuracy of the load forecast, thus eliminating completely
the need of the out-of-the-market uplifts. Another signif-
icant property of TLMP (Proposition 3 of Part II) is the
decomposition of the merchandising surplus of the operator
into congestion and ramping surplus, which has significant
implications on the revenue adequacy of ISO, incentives for
truthful revelation of ramping limits, and incentives for the
generators to improve their ramping capabilities.
Given that TLMP is discriminatory, one may question how
different it is from other discriminative pricing schemes.
Besides TLMP, the pay-as-bid (PAB) pricing is perhaps
the only discriminative pricing mechanism that satisfies the
strong equilibrium conditions for multi-interval economic
dispatch; it trivially provides dispatch following incentives.
3The main short-coming of PAB is that it is vulnerable to
manipulative bidding behavior.
The differences between TLMP and PAB pricing are
significant, however. In the absence of binding ramping
constraints, TLMP is the same as LMP; it thus inherits the
same incentive compatibility advantage of LMP over PAB
pricing under the perfect competition assumptions* [19], [20].
When ramping events occur, whether a generator can benefit
by inflating its generation offers depends on the ramping
scenarios. Indeed, examples exist that inflating generation
offers may very well lower generation profit [21].
Discriminative pricing is often criticized for the lack of
transparency, which makes it difficult for the operator to
provide public pricing signals to market participants. Because
of the decomposition of TLMP into the standard LMP and
a discriminative ramping price in (1), it may be argued
that TLMP offers the same level of transparency as LMP
when the discriminative out-of-the-market uplifts used by
LMP are taken into account. TLMP simply exercises the
discrimination inside rather than out of the market.
Finally, in Part II of the paper, we generalize the theory
of dispatch-following incentives to more general models that
include network constraints and discuss a broader set of
incentive and performance issues. As a generalization of
LMP, we show that TLMP introduces a discriminative penalty
when a generator reaches its ramping limits. Consequently,
TLMP provides incentives for generators to reveal its ramp-
ing limits truthfully when all existing pricing schemes have
situations that a generator is better-off to under-report its
ramping limits. When comparing different pricing schemes,
our results shine lights on practical tradeoffs along several
dimensions: the revenue adequacy of the ISO, consumer
payments, generator profits, the interplays of ramping and
congestion limits, and price volatilities.
A few words are in order on the scope and limitations
of this paper. The models used in this two-part paper have
limitations. In particular, we do not model the strategic
behavior of the generators; nor do we consider alternatives to
pricing ramping explicitly in the real-time market. We discuss
in Sec. VI some of the implications of these omissions. We
also ignore the role of unit commitment and the cost of the
reserve. In Part I, we illustrate the properties of LMP and
TLMP with a toy example. Generalizations to systems with
network constraints and more elaborate numerical examples
are in Part II. The proofs of the theorems can be found in
the appendix at the end of this paper.
C. Notations and nomenclature
Designated symbols are listed in Table I. Otherwise, no-
tations used here are standard. We use (x1, · · · , xN ) for a
column vector and [x1, · · · , xN ] a row vector. All vectors
are denoted by lower-case boldface letters, nominally as
*In practice, the price-taking assumption for the generators may be
unrealistic, and market power under LMP may exist [18].
columns. The transpose of vector x is denoted by x⊺.
Matrices are boldface capital letters. Matrix X = [xij ] is
a matrix with xij as its (i, j)th entry. Similar to the vector
notation, matrix X = [x1, · · · ,xN ] has xi as its ith column,
and matrix X = (x⊺1 , · · · ,x
⊺
N ) has x
⊺
i as ith row.
0,1: vector of all zeros and ones.
A: The upper bi-diagonal matrix with −1 as
diagonals and 1 as off diagonals.
dt,d: demand in interval t, d = (d1, · · · , dT ).
dt: demand in rolling l t, dt = (dt, · · · , dt+W−1).
dˆt, dˆt: demand forecast: dˆt = (dˆt, · · · , dˆt+W−1).
fit(·): the bid-in cost of generator i in interval t.
F (·): aggregated bid-in cost curve.
Fit(·): aggregated supply curve excluding generation
from generator i in interval t.
git: generation/dispatch of generator i in interval t
gi: generation/dispatch of generator i over a several
intervals, e.g., gi = (gi1, · · · , giT )
g[t]: generation/dispatch vector for all generators in
interval t, g[t] = (g1t, · · · , gNt).
G: generation/dispatch matrix. G =
[
g[1], · · · , g[T ]
]
.
Gt,G: dispatch policy for intervals starting at t.
GED
t
,GED: Multi-interval economic dispatch policies
gED
i
,GED: Multi-interval economic dispatch signals.
gR-ED
i
,GR-ED: Rolling-window economic dispatch signals.
Ht: scheduling window Ht = {t, · · · , t+W − 1}.
H : scheduling horizon H = {1, · · · , T}.
LOC: Lost-of-opportunity cost uplift
MW: Make-whole uplift.
Pt,PLMPt : multi-interval pricing policy. LMP pricing.
pi
LMP,piTLMP: Multi-interval LMP and TLMP.
pi
R-TLMP: Rolling-window TLMP.
T : Total number of scheduling intervals.
W : Scheduling window. W ≤ T .
TABLE I: List of major symbols used in alphabetic order.
II. MULTI-INTERVAL DISPATCH AND PRICING MODELS
We consider a bid-based real-time electricity market in-
volving one inelastic demand, N generating firms, and a
system operator (SO). The scheduling period of generations
involves T unit-length intervals H = {1, · · · , T }, where
interval t covers the time interval [t, t + 1). Typically, T is
the number of intervals in a day.
We assume that each generator produces a generation offer
that defines the best offer to generate over T intervals. Implic-
itly, the generation offer expresses its generation costs (both
fuel and opportunity costs) in the form of the minimum price
of generation. The offer also includes generation constraints
such as generation capacity and ramping limits that are used
in the dispatch and pricing decisions of the operator.
The operator collects bids from all generating firms, al-
locates generation levels to all generators in the form of
dispatch signals, and determines the prices of electricity in
each scheduling interval. Because the bid of a generator
represents its best offer to generate, the generator expects the
total payment received over T intervals to be no less than that
computed from its offered prices; anything less implies the
loss-of-opportunity costs to be compensated by some form
of out-of-the market uplifts.
4Part I of the paper assumes a single bus network, which is
generalized to networks with N buses subject network con-
straints in Part II. We introduce two multi-interval scheduling
and pricing models. One is the one-shot model that sets
generation dispatch and prices over the entire scheduling
period at once, the other the rolling-window model that
sets the dispatch levels and prices sequentially with demand
forecasts for several intervals into the future.
A. One-shot multi-interval dispatch and pricing policies
At t = 1, the operator obtains the demand forecast vector
dˆ = (dˆ1, · · · , dˆT ) over the entire scheduling period, where dˆt
is the demand forecast for interval t. Let the actual demand
be d = (d1, · · · , dT ). We assume that the forecast of the first
interval is accurate, i.e., dˆ1 = d1.
A one-shot dispatch schedules generations over the T -
interval scheduling horizon H based on the initial forecast
dˆ. Let git be the dispatch
† of generator i in interval t,
gi = (gi1, · · · , giT ) the dispatch for generator i over H ,
g[t] = (g1t, · · · , gNt) the dispatch for all generators in
interval t, and the N × T matrix G =
[
g[1], · · · ,g[T ]
]
the
dispatch matrix with g
⊺
i as its ith row.
A one-shot dispatch policy G maps the demand forecast dˆ
and the initial generation g[0] to a dispatch matrix G:
G(dˆ,g[0]) =G,
where g[0] imposes the initial ramping constraints on the
generations in the first interval.
Similarly, a one-shot pricing policy P sets the prices in
all intervals at once. A one-shot uniform price is defined
by a vector pi = (pi1, · · · , piT ) with pit being the price of
electricity in interval t for all generators and the demand.
For a nonuniform pricing policy, P sets pi0 the price vector
for the demand and pii = (pii1, · · · , piiT ) for generator i, for
i = 1, · · · , N .
B. One-shot economic dispatch and LMP
A special case of the one-shot dispatch is the multi-interval
economic dispatch GED over H . Let the aggregated bid-in
cost function be
F (G) :=
N∑
i=1
∑
t∈H
fit(git), (2)
where fit(·) is the bid-in cost curve
‡ of generator i in interval
t, assumed to be convex and almost everywhere differentiable
for all t and i throughout the paper.
†We make a distinction between dispatch and actual generation. When a
dispatch policy sets the dispatch signal of generator i in interval t to git,
the actual generation may be different.
‡The derivative of the bid-in cost curve represents the supply curve of the
generator.
The dispatch policy GED is defined by
GED : minimize
{G=[git]}
F (G)
subject to for all i and t ∈ H
λt :
N∑
i=1
git = dˆt,
(µ
it
, µ¯it) : −ri ≤ gi(t+1) − git ≤ r¯i
0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
(ρ
it
, ρ¯it) : 0 ≤ git ≤ g¯i,
(3)
where g¯i the generation capacity, and (ri, r¯i) the down and up
ramp-limits, λt the dual variable for the equality constraints,
and (ρ
it
, ρ¯it, µit, µ¯it) ≥ 0 are dual variables for inequality
constraints.
The one-shot locational marginal price§ (LMP for short)
is a uniform price piLMP = (piLMPt ) with pi
LMP
t defined by the
marginal cost of generation with respect to the demand in
interval t. In particular, we have, by the envelope theorem,
piLMPt :=
∂
∂dˆt
F (GED) = λ∗t , t = 1, · · · , T,
where GED and λ∗t are part of a solution to (3).
C. Rolling-window look-ahead dispatch model
A rolling-window dispatch policy G = (G1, · · · ,GT ) is
defined by a sequence of W -interval look-ahead policies
that generate dispatch signals g[1], · · · ,g[T ] sequentially,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. At time t, the policy Gt has a
look-ahead scheduling window of W intervals, denoted by
Ht = {t, · · · , t+W−1}. The interval t is called the binding
interval and the rest of Ht the advisory intervals. As time t
increases, Ht slides across the entire scheduling period H .
At time t, a W -interval one-shot policy Gt maps demand
forecast dˆt = (dˆt, · · · , dˆt+W−1) and previously realized
generation g[t−1] to an N×W generation scheduling matrix
Gˆt over Ht:
Gt(dˆt,g[t− 1]) =
[
gˆ[t], · · · , gˆ[t+W − 1]
]
= Gˆt.
The rolling window policy G sets generation in interval t by
g[t] := gˆ[t]. The rest of columns of Gˆt are not implemented.
1 2 3 T
Time
4 5
Binding interval
Advisory interval
PSfrag replacements
G1
G2
G3
t = 1
t = 2
t = 3
Fig. 1: Rolling-window dispatch with window size W = 4
generated from one-shot dispatch policy Gt. The
same applies also to the rolling-window pricing.
§We retain the LMP terminology even though the model considered here
does not involve a network.
5Similarly, a rolling-window pricing policy P is defined by
a sequence one-shot pricing policies (P1, · · · ,PT ). At time
t, Pt sets the prices over Ht, and the price in the binding
interval t is implemented by P .
As an example, the rolling-window economic dispatch
policy GR-ED = (GED1 , · · · ,G
ED
T ) where G
ED
t is the W -window
one-shot economic dispatch defined in (3) with T = W and
dˆ = dˆt. The rolling-window LMP policy P
R-LMP is defined
by a sequence of W -interval LMP policies (PLMP1 , · · · ,P
LMP
T ).
III. DISPATCH-FOLLOWING INCENTIVES AND UPLIFTS
We say that a pricing mechanism provides dispatch-
following incentives if, given the realized prices over the
entire scheduling period H , profit-maximizing generators,
by themselves, would have produced generations that match
the dispatch signal from the operator.
We apply the market equilibrium models for dispatch-
following incentives. To this end, we consider two types
incentives: (i) the ex-post incentive that applies to the entire
scheduling period H after all generations have been realized;
(ii) the ex-ante incentive that applies to only the current (bind-
ing) scheduling interval. The former guarantees dispatch-
following incentives when a generator considers the total
profit over the entire scheduling period. The latter guarantees
dispatch-following incentives only for the binding interval.
A. Ex-post dispatch incentive and general equilibrium
For a multi-interval dispatch and pricing problem, gener-
ation and consumption in each interval can be treated as a
separate market; we thus have a set of T inter-dependent mar-
kets over H . For purposes of analyzing dispatch-following
incentives, we borrow the notion of general equilibrium [22,
p. 547] for the multi-interval pricing problem.
Definition 1 (General equilibrium). Let d be the actual
demand, gi the dispatch for generator i and pi the vector
of electricity prices over the entire scheduling period H .
Let the N × T matrix G = (g⊺1 , · · · ,g
⊺
N ) be the realized
generation matrix for all generators. We say (G,pi) forms
a general equilibrium if the following market clearing and
individual rationality conditions are satisfied:
1) Market clearing condition:
N∑
i=1
git = dt for all t ∈ H .
2) Individual rationality condition: for all i, the dispatch
g(i) = (gi1, · · · , giT ) is the solution of the individual
profit maximization:
maximize
(g1,··· ,gT )
∑T
t=1(pitgt − fit(gt))
subject to for all t = 1, · · · , T − 1,
−ri ≤ gt+1 − gt ≤ r¯i,
0 ≤ gt ≤ g¯i, ∀t ∈ H .
(4)
We call pi an equilibrium price supporting generation G.
In the context of analyzing dispatch-following incentives,
we are interested in whether price signal pi and dispatch
G satisfy the general equilibrium condition. Because G is
computed centrally, the market-clearing condition is already
met; only individual rationality is needed.
It turns out that, in the absence of forecasting error, the
one-shot LMP supports the one-shot economic dispatch as
stated in Theorem 1. This result is entirely analogous to the
well-known property of LMP for the single period economic
dispatch with network constraints [23].
Theorem 1 (LMP as a General Equilibrium Price). When
there is no forecast error, dˆ = d, the one-shot economic
dispatch matrix GED and the one-shot LMP piLMP form a
general equilibrium.
As a general equilibrium price, piLMP does not guarantee
that that piLMPit git ≥ fit(git) for all (i, t). In other words, a
generator may be underpaid in some intervals despite that
the generator is maximally compensated under piLMP over the
entire scheduling period. See Example 1 in Sec. V.
B. Ex-ante dispatch incentives and partial equilibrium
When rolling-window dispatch is used, the forecasts in the
look-ahead window (hence the dispatch over the window)
change, which creates the missing payment problem even
when the forecast over the look-ahead window is perfect.
Consider the example of rolling-window economic dis-
patch GR-ED and LMP PR-LMP policies. Suppose that a generator
i is underpaid in interval t, i.e., fit(g
R-LMP
it ) ≥ pi
R-LMP
t g
R-ED
it . Be-
cause gR-EDit is generated by theW -window economic dispatch
based on forecast dˆt, generator i expects the underpayment
in interval t be compensated later in t′ ∈ Ht. At time t
′,
however, a different forecast dˆt′ is used to generate dispatch
gR-EDit′ . There is no guarantee that pi
R-LMP
t′ is high enough to
compensate for the loss incurred in the interval t, hence the
missing payment problem.
To provide dispatch-following incentives under forecasting
uncertainty, we need stronger equilibrium conditions.
Definition 2 (Partial equilibrium and strong equilibrium).
Consider price vector pi = (pi1, · · · , piT ) and generation ma-
trix G over the entire scheduling horizon H . The dispatch-
price pair (g[t], pit) in interval t is a partial equilibrium
if it satisfies the market clearing and individual rationality
conditions in interval t:
1) Market clearing condition:
∑N
i=1 git = dt;
2) Individual rationality condition: for all i, the dispatch
of signal git is the solution to the individual profit
maximization:
maximize
g
(pitg − fit(g))
subject to 0 ≤ g ≤ g¯i
−ri ≤ g − gi(t−1) ≤ r¯i.
(5)
The dispatch-price pair (G,pi) is a strong equilibrium and
pi a strong equilibrium price supporting G if (G,pi) is a
6general equilibrium and (g[t], pit) a partial equilibrium for
all t.
The notion of partial equilibrium used here is slightly
different from the standard because of the sequential nature
of multi-interval dispatch and pricing problems. At time t, the
dispatch in the interval t is necessarily constrained by the past
dispatch. The dispatch in the future intervals is advisory and
subject to change, which is the reason that only the ramping
constraints from the previous interval are imposed.
The strong equilibrium conditions impose stricter con-
straints than that required by the general and partial equi-
librium definitions; strong equilibrium implies general equi-
librium. Unlike the case of a general equilibrium price that
only needs to satisfy the rationality condition at the end of the
scheduling horizon, a strong equilibrium price must provide
a dispatch-following incentive in every interval independent
of future realized dispatches. Consequently, even if schedules
and prices may change, for the binding interval, there is no
incentive for the generator to deviate from the dispatch signal.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that, in absence of
ramping constraints, (GED,piLMP) forms a strong equilibrium.
However, we also know from Example 1 in Sec. V that, when
ramping constraints are binding, (GED,piLMP) may not be a
strong equilibrium. Does there exist a uniform price pi such
that (GED,piLMP) satisfies the strong equilibrium conditions?
Theorem 2 (Strong equilibrium and uniform price). Let
dˆ = d be the actual demand and GED the one-shot economic
dispatch over H . If there exists a generator i and an interval
t such that, under the one-shot economic dispatch,
1) generator i is marginal, i.e., 0 < gEDit < g¯it, and
2) the ramping constraint of (gEDit ) between interval t− 1
and t is not binding and that between interval t and
t+ 1 binding with all multipliers being positive,
then there does not exist uniform prices pi for which (GED,pi)
is a strong equilibrium.
The conditions above on the one-shot economic dispatch
are mild; they are easily satisfied for stochastic demands over
a sufficiently large T . As is shown in the appendix of this
paper, empirical studies based on a practical network and
demand model shows that the above conditions are satisfied
by overwhelming majority of cases.
The significance of Theorem 2 is that all uniform prices
suffer from the lack of dispatch-following incentives. As a
result, out-of-the-market uplifts are necessary to ensure that
generators follow the operator’s dispatch signal.
C. Out-of-the-market settlements
The out-of-the-market settlement, also known as uplift, is a
process for the operator to compensate market participants for
inadequate payments due to inaccurate, incomplete, or non-
convex models. Out-of-the-market settlements are in general
discriminative and determined in ex-post over the entire
scheduling horizon H [9], [11], [24]. Two popular schemes
are the make-whole (MW) settlement used in most SOs in
the U.S. and the lost-of-opportunity-cost (LOC) settlement
implemented in ISO-NE.
Let pi be the price vector over H and gi = (gi1, · · · , giT )
the generation of generator i. The make-whole (MW) pay-
ment MW(pi,gi) and the lost-of-opportunity cost (LOC)
payment LOC(pi,gi) for generator i are defined by, respec-
tively,
MW(pi,gi) = max{0,
T∑
t=1
(fit(git)− pitgit)}, (6)
LOC(pi,gi) = Qi(pi)−
T∑
t=1
(pitgit − fit(git)), (7)
whereQi(pi) is the maximum profit the generator would have
received if the generator self-schedule for the given price pi:
Qi(pi) = maximize
p=(p1,··· ,pT )
∑T
t=1(pitpt − fit(pt))
subject to 0 ≤ pt ≤ g¯i
−ri ≤ p(t+1) − pt ≤ r¯i.
(8)
It turns out that, when Qi(pi) ≥ 0, we always have
LOC(pi,gi) ≥ MW(pi,gi). See the appendix of this paper
for detailed proofs.
The following proposition, an immediate consequence of
the general equilibrium conditions, shows that the LOC uplift
is a measure of the disincentives of generators to follow the
dispatch.
Proposition 1 (LOC and general equilibrium). A dispatch
matrix-price pair (G = [g1, · · · ,gN ]
⊺,pi) satisfies the gen-
eral equilibrium condition if and only if the LOC uplifts for
all generators are zero.
IV. TEMPORAL LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICE
Because uniform pricing cannot provide dispatch-
following incentives in general, we now consider nonuniform
pricing mechanisms. To this end, we extend LMP to the
temporal locational marginal price (TLMP) and establish that
TLMP is a strong equilibrium price.
A. TLMP: a generalization of LMP
We first consider the one-shot TLMP defined over H ; the
rolling-window TLMP follows the same way as the rolling-
window LMP.
As in LMP, TLMP prices a load by the marginal cost
of satisfying its demand. Unlike LMP, TLMP prices the
generation from generator i by its contribution to meeting
the system load. In particular, we treat generator i as a
negative demand and pay generator i at the marginal benefit
of its generation. Roughly speaking, generator i is paid at
the marginal cost to the system when generator i reduces 1
MW of its generation.
7Define a parameterized economic dispatch by treating git
as a parameter rather than a decision variable in (3). Let the
partial cost be
Fit(G) := F (G)− fit(git),
which excludes the cost of generator i in interval t. The
parameterized economic dispatch is defined by (3) with
Fit(G) as the cost function and {gi′t′ , (i
′, t′) 6= (i, t)} as
its decision variables.
Definition 3 (TLMP). The TLMP for the demand in interval
t is defined by the marginal cost of meeting the demand:
piTLMP0t :=
∂
∂dˆt
F (GED).
The TLMP for generator i in interval t is defined by the
marginal benefit of generator i at git = g
ED
it :
piTLMPit := −
∂
∂git
Fit(G
ED).
Proposition 2 gives an explicit expression for TLMP.
Proposition 2. Let GED be the solution of the multi-interval
economic dispatch in (3) and (λ∗t , µ
∗
t
, µ¯∗t , ρ
∗
t
, ρ¯∗t ) the dual
variables associated with the constraints. The TLMP for the
demand in interval t is given by
piTLMP0t = λ
∗
t .
The TLMP for the generator i in interval t is given by
piTLMPit = λ
∗
t +∆
∗
it, (9)
where ∆∗it = ∆µ
∗
it −∆µ
∗
i(t−1), and ∆µ
∗
it := µ¯
∗
it − µ
∗
it
.
Proposition 2 reveals the structure of TLMP as a natural
extension of LMP; it adds to the uniform pricing of LMP
with a discriminative ramping price ∆∗it. The LMP portion
of TLMP is public as it represents the system-wide energy
price whereas the private ramping price accounts for the
individual ramping capabilities. Note also that TLMP incurs
no additional computation costs beyond that in LMP.
Four interpretations of the ramping price ∆∗it in TLMP are
in order. First, note that TLMP expression above is consistent
with that in (1); both expressions give the interpretation that
the ramping price in TLMP is the increment of the shadow
prices associated with the ramping constraints.
Second, the ramping price ∆∗it can be positive or negative.
When the ramping price ∆∗it > 0, it can be interpreted as an
upfront payment for the ramping-induced lost-of-opportunity
cost, which ensures that the generator under TLMP is never
under-paid below its generation cost. When it is negative, it
has the interpretation of a penalty for its inability to ramp
for greater welfare. See discussions on Example I in Sec. V.
Third, the ramping price ∆∗it can be viewed as the price
adjustments around LMP such that, if each generator self
schedules, the economic dispatch GED is the profit maximiz-
ing schedule.
Finally, the ramping price∆∗it serves to penalize generators
with limited ramping capabilities. For simplicity, ignore the
down-ramp limits (i.e., µ∗
it
= 0) and compute the revenue
RTLMPi of generator i:
RTLMPi =
∑
t
piTLMPit g
ED
it = R
LMP
i −
∑
t
µ¯∗itr¯i ≤ R
LMP
i .
This implies that, comparing with LMP, TLMP penalizes
generators with limited ramping capability, which incen-
tivizes the generator to report truthfully its ramping limits.
See Proposition 4 and related discussions in Part II [25].
B. Dispatch-Following Incentives of TLMP
We now consider the equilibrium and dispatch-following
properties. Because TLMP is nonuniform pricing, the general
and partial equilibrium definitions are given in the previous
section need to be generalized slightly.
• Instead of having a single price vector for all generator,
we now have an individualized price vector pii for each
generator i.
• The individual rationality conditions extend naturally by
replacing pit in (4-5) by piit.
Theorem 3 establishes the strong equilibrium property for
the one-shot TLMP.
Theorem 3 (One-shot TLMP as a strong equilibrium price).
When there is no forecasting error, i.e., dˆ = d, the one-
shot multi-interval economic dispatch policy G
ED
and the
TLMP policy P
TLMP
form a strong equilibrium, thus there is
no incentive for any generator to deviate from the economic
dispatch signal.
In addition, the one-shot TLMP guarantees revenue ad-
equacy for the operator with total merchandising surplus
equal to the ramping charge:
MS :=
∑
t
piTLMP0t dt −
∑
i>0,t
piTLMPit g
ED
it
=
∑
i,t
(µ¯∗itr¯i + µ
∗
it
ri). (10)
The intuition behind the above theorem is evident from a
dual perspective of the economic dispatch. Specifically, the
Lagrangian of the one-shot economic dispatch (3) with the
optimal multipliers can be written as
L =
∑
i,t
(
fit(git)− (λ
∗
t +∆
∗
it)git + (ρ¯
∗
it − ρ
∗
it
)git
)
+ · · ·
where the rest of the terms above are independent of git. It
is evident that, with TLMP piTLMPit := λ
∗
t + ∆
∗
it, the optimal
dispatch g∗it should always satisfy the individual rationality
condition for all i and t.
The positive merchandising surplus and (10) are also not
surprising; they are entirely analogous to the same property
for LMP when network congestions occur.
8What happens when the load forecasts are not accurate?
More importantly, is the rolling-window TLMP a strong
equilibrium price for the rolling-window dispatch?
Theorem 4 (R-TLMP as a strong equilibrium price). Let
gR-EDi be the rolling-window dispatch for generator i and
piR-EDi its rolling-window TLMP. Then, for all i and under
arbitrary demand forecast error, (gR-EDi ,pi
R-TLMP) forms a strong
equilibrium, and
LOC(piR-TLMPi ,g
R-ED
i ) = 0. (11)
Note that, when a generator has a positive final profit (with
LOC uplift), then the make-whole payment for the generator
is also zero.
The above theorem highlights the most significant property
of TLMP for practical situations when the load forecasts used
in the rolling-window dispatch are not perfect. There is no
uniform pricing policy that can achieve the same.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
We consider two toy examples involving T = 3 intervals,
one for the one-shot dispatch and pricing policies with perfect
load forecasts, the other for the rolling-window policies with
inaccurate forecasts. The parameters of the generators are the
same for both examples and shown in Table II.
G1
G2
Capacity Marginal
cost 
Ramp
limit
(40, 25, 30)
420 590 590
(90, 35, 30) (90, 30, 30)
500 
500
25
30
500
50
(380, 25, 25) (500, 35, 35) (500, 30, 30)
PSfrag replacements
(gEDit , pi
LMP
t , pi
TLMP
it )
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
dt
g¯i ci ri = r¯i
TABLE II: One-shot economic dispatch, LMP, and TLMP.
Initial generation g[0] = 0. The price for
demand dt is pi
LMP
t .
A. Example I: one-shot dispatch and pricing
The economic dispatch, LMP, and TLMP over three inter-
vals are given in the right part of Table II. We make four
observations.
First, G1’s ramping limits are not binding over the three
intervals. The LMP and TLMP are the same for G1.
Second, the ramping constraint for G2 is binding between
the first and second intervals, making the price of generation
under TLMP different from its LMP. Note that in interval
t = 1, G2 is scheduled to generate at the LMP of $25/MW,
$5 below its marginal cost of $30/MW. As a result, G2 incurs
an opportunity cost of $200 so that it can ramp up to the
maximum to the next interval and be paid at $5 above its
marginal cost. Despite the loss in the first interval, the total
surplus over the three intervals is maximized. By the general
equilibrium property of LMP, there is no incentive for G2 to
deviate from the dispatch.
Third, in contrast to LMP, TLMP pays G2 up-front the
opportunity cost by adding $5/MW to the energy price of
$25/MW. The up-front payment removes the incentive for
G2 to deviate not knowing future demands. For this reason,
the discriminative part of TLMP in (9) has an interpretation
as the premium for the ramping-induced opportunity cost.
Note also that, the opportunity cost premium paid to G2 in
interval 1 is removed in interval 2.
Fourth, consider the case when the true ramping limit of
G2 is 100 MW. Had G2 reported the ramping limit truthfully,
G2 would have been dispatched to generate 0 MW in interval
1 and 90 in interval 2 at $30 MW/h with total profit of zero
dollar. But if G2 falsely declares that it has ramp limit of 50
MW as shown in Table II, we see that G2 under LMP would
have made $250 profit. This shows that under LMP, there is
an incentive for G2 to under-declare its ramp limit. Under
TLMP, on the other hand, there is no incentive for G2 to lie
about its ramp limit. See more examples in Part II [25].
B. Example II: rolling-window dispatch and pricing
Table III shows the rolling-window economic dispatch and
rolling-window prices with window size W = 2. The load
forecasts dˆt = (dˆt, dˆt+1) are listed and dˆt = dt being the
actual load. Note that dˆt contains forecast errors.
G1
G2
Capacity Marginal
cost
Ramp
limit
(50, 25, 30)
(420,600) (590,600) (590,590)
(90, 30, 30) (90, 30, 30)
500
500
25
30
500
50
(370, 25, 25) (500, 30, 30) (500, 30, 30)
PSfrag replacements
(gR-EDit , pi
R-LMP
t , pi
R-TLMP
it )
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
dˆt
g¯i ci ri = r¯i
TABLE III: Rolling-window economic dispatch, LMP,
and TLMP. Initial generation g[0] = 0. Load
is settled at the LMP piLMPt for all t.
We again make four observations. First, the missing money
scenario happens in this example. G2 is underpaid by piR-LMP1
in the interval t = 1. Unlike the one-shot LMP case,
the underpayment is never compensated under R-LMP. The
underpayment is compensated out of the market. The LOC
and MW uplifts to G2 are both $250.
Second, from Table I, the dispatch of G2 satisfies the
conditions in Theorem 2. There is no uniform price can be
a strong equilibrium price for the economic dispatch. For
this example, the argument becomes trivial. Consider interval
t = 1, for any price greater than $25, G1 self-scheduling
would have generated more than 380 (MW). If the price is
$25, G2 self-scheduling would have generated zero (MW).
Third, for G2 in interval t = 1, given the inaccurate
load forecast of 600 for interval t = 2, the rolling-window
dispatch for interval t = 2 is 100, which makes the ramping
constraints from t = 0 to t = 1 and from t = 1 to t = 2
both binding. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these
9two binding constraints are zero and five¶, respectively. The
TLMP for G2 is, therefore, $5 above the LMP, which com-
pensates the underpayment of LMP to the level of marginal
cost. In intervals of t = 2, 3, there are no binding ramping
constraints for G2. G2 is paid at the LMP. No missing money
for TLMP.
Fourth, there is again no incentive for G2 to declare its
ramp limit untruthfully under TLMP; it will be paid at its
marginal costs. Under LMP, however, there is an incentive
for G2 to declare that it has high ramping limits, say 100
MW, and avoid the opportunity cost in the first interval.
We should caution that the toy examples considered in
this section are designed to gain insights into the behavior
of these pricing mechanisms. The observations drawn from
the examples may not hold in general. See Part II for more
elaborate Monte Carlo simulations.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
We discuss in this section aspects of pricing multi-interval
dispatch that are not covered in this two-part paper. The
purpose is to provide a broader perspective and contexts
beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on two issues: one
is the general market model used in developing multi-interval
pricing, the other the impacts of strategic bidding.
A. Pricing model
A rigorous study of pricing can be treated as a mechanism
design problem, for which a complete model includes a
model for the auctioneer (the system operator) and models
for the bidders (the generating firms). An excellent example
of using the the compete market model to analyze pricing
of electricity is the work of Hobbs [26] where a Nash-
Cournot competition is formulated in analyzing decentralized
(bilateral) and centralized (poolco) power markets. Another
example is the work of Philpott, Ferris, and Wets [27] on the
equilibrium, uncertainty, and risk in hydro-thermal systems,
which is relevant to the current work for its modeling of
inter-temporal constraints and uncertainty.
The bid-based market model assumed here includes only
the model for the operator who collects the bids (generation
offers) and makes two decisions: one is the allocation of the
production levels of the goods (the dispatch over multiple
intervals). The other is the purchasing prices of the goods in
each interval. We do not have models for the N generating
firms in this paper, assuming only that each firm produces a
bid that represents its best offer to generate. Behind such bids,
however, are N optimizations that take into account (fuel and
opportunity) costs as well as generation constraints. Some of
these constraints such as generation capacities and ramping
limits are revealed as part of the bids and used explicitly by
the operator in its allocation and pricing decisions. Other
constraints such as fuel contracts or reservoir constraints
¶Primal degeneracy occurs in this example. Shadow prices associated with
ramping and power balance constraints are used to compute TLMP.
of a hydro plant are kept private and not used by the
operator. The costs of meeting those unrevealed constraints
are internalized as part of their bids or revealed to the
operator for possible opportunity cost adjustments. As an
example, see the computation of opportunity cost adder for
the use-limited resources in CAISO’s proposal [28]
By neglecting the underlying optimization of individual
firms, we lose the ability to characterize fully strategic
behavior of the firms. We gain, on the other hand, the
analytical tractability that isolates those factors most perti-
nent to ramping-induced incentives. In practice, the model
assumed here captures the pricing problem of the operator
who rarely has access to the optimization models of the
market participants.
Relevant to ramping constraints, there is a fundamental
question on who should be responsible for pricing ramping
costs. Should the cost of ramping be reflected entirely in the
bids of the generating firms through their individual optimiza-
tions, or should it be captured explicitly by the operator in
its pricing model as assumed in recent proposals of ramping
products and in this paper? This is highly complex question
and is outside the scope of this paper. See discussions and
comments in [29].
B. Strategic bidding under discriminative pricing
There is a general concern that discriminative pricing
may be vulnerable to market manipulation from firms with
market power. The gold standard for incentive compatibility
is the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism [30] which
happens to be a discriminative pricing mechanism when it is
applied to the electricity market [31]. VCG mechanism, how-
ever, has various undesirable properties and vulnerabilities in
practice as shown in [32], [33].
At the outset, note that, as a generalization of LMP, TLMP
inherits the vulnerabilities and some advantages of LMP
against strategic manipulation. For instance, LMP is known to
be vulnerable to strategic manipulations by firms with market
power. So is TLMP. Under LMP, the so-called hockey-
stick bidding can cause significant loss of social welfare in
scarcity scenarios. The same can happen to TLMP. Mitigation
strategies against hockey-stick bidding such as CSM [34] has
similar effects on both LMP and TLMP.
PAB is a discriminative pricing scheme that also eliminates
the need of out-of-the-market uplifts. PAB is known to be
vulnerable to manipulations by simply raise its bids beyond
the marginal cost. Depending on scenarios of network-wide
binding ramping constraints, a bidding strategy that works
well under PAB can lead to lower revenue when it is applied
to TLMP. See examples in [21]. To develop an optimal
bidding strategy for multi-interval problem requires that the
firm has the ability to forecast not only future demand but
also binding ramping conditions. Such conditions depend
on varying hyper-parameters of the overall system that are
difficult to estimate.
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VII. CONCLUSION
We have developed a theory for dispatch-following incen-
tives based on concepts of equilibrium prices in competitive
markets. Given that there is no uniform pricing mechanism
that can guarantee dispatch-following incentives without dis-
criminative out-of-the-market uplifts, a non-uniform pricing
mechanism such as TLMP serves as an alternative. As an
extension of LMP, TLMP prices generation based on both
the energy and the ramping-induced opportunity costs. As
a strong equilibrium pricing mechanism, TLMP guarantees
dispatch-following incentives under arbitrary forecast errors.
Evaluating pricing schemes in practice must take into
account many factors. In [25], we conduct more careful
simulation studies under relevant performance metrics to
compare several benchmark pricing schemes.
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APPENDIX
A. Preliminaries
We derive a more compact vector-matrix representation of
LMP, TLMP and associated representations. For convenience,
we focus on scheduling window H = {1, · · · ,W}. Let the
demand (or forecasted demand) be d = (d1, · · · , dW ) be
the demand in H , gi = (gi1, · · · , giW ) the generation of
generator i, and G⊺ = [g1, · · · ,gN ] the generation matrix.
The W -interval economic dispatch in the vector-matrix form
is defined by
G
ED
: minimize
{G}
F (G) =
∑
i fi(gi)
subject to for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N
λ : G⊺1 = d
(ρ
i
, ρ¯i) : 0 ≤ gi ≤ g¯i,
(µ
i
, µ¯i) : −ri ≤ Agi ≤ r¯i,
(12)
where fi(gi) =
∑
t fit(git) is the total cost for generator
i, λ = (λ1, · · · , λW ), the vector of dual variables for
the equality constraints and (ρ
i
, ρ¯i,µi, µ¯i) vectors of dual
variables for the inequalities associated generator i, and A
an upper triangular matrix with −1 as diagonals, 1 as the
first off-diagonals, and zero elsewhere.
Let the Lagrangian of G
ED
be
L =
∑
i
fi(gi) + λ
⊺(d−G⊺1)
+
∑
i
(
µ¯
⊺
i (Agi − r¯i)− µ
⊺
i
(Agi + ri)
)
+
∑
i
(
ρ¯
⊺
i (gi − g¯i)− ρ
⊺
i
gi
)
. (13)
Let (GED,λ∗,ρ∗
i
, ρ¯∗i ,µ
∗
i
, µ¯∗i ) be the solution of G
ED
. The
KKT condition gives
∇fi(g
∗
i )− λ
∗ +A⊺∆µ∗i +∆ρ
∗
i = 0 (14)
where ∆µ∗i = µ¯
∗
i − µ
∗
i
and ∆ρ∗i = ρ¯
∗
i − ρ
∗
i
.
The vector form of the multi-interval LMP and TLMP of
generator i are given by, respectively,
piLMP = λ∗, piTLMPi = λ
∗ −A⊺∆µ∗i . (15)
For the individual rationality condition, for generator i,
we have the following profit maximization problem for given
price pi:
G˜i : minimize
g
fi(g)− g
⊺pi
subject to (η, η¯) : − ri ≤ Ag ≤ r¯i,
(ζ, ζ¯) : 0 ≤ g ≤ g¯i.
(16)
By the KKT condition, the solution of the above must satisfy
∇fi(g)− pi +A
⊺∆η +∆ζ = 0, (17)
where ∆η = η¯ − η and ∆ζ = ζ¯ − ζ.
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B. Proof of Theorem 1
Let GED be the one-shot economic dispatch and piLMP the
LMP. The market clearing condition is already satisfied by
GED. The individual rationality condition (17) holds by setting
(g = gEDi ,∆ηi = ∆µ
∗
i ,∆ζi = ∆ρ
∗
i ). 
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that (GED,pi) satisfies the strong equilibrium
conditions. Let gEDi be the economic dispatch for generator i.
From the general equilibrium condition, (gEDi ,pi) satisfies the
individual rationality condition for every i. Let η
i
, η¯i, ζi, ζ¯i
be a set of Lagrange multipliers associated with gEDi of (16).
By the KKT condition,
∇fi(g
ED
i )− pi +A
⊺∆ηi +∆ζi = 0,
where ∆ηi = η¯i − ηi and ∆ζi = ζ¯i − ζi.
By the KKT condition of (12), (pi,η
i
, η¯i, ζi, ζ¯i) must also
be a solution of the optimal multipliers associated with (12).
Suppose that gEDit satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2.
From the KKT condition of (12),
d
dg
fit(g
ED
it ) = pit −∆η
∗
it, (18)
where ∆η∗it 6= 0. But for (G
ED,pi) to be a strong equilibrium,
gEDit must be a solution of
min
g∈Xit
(fit(g)− pitg) ⇒
d
dg
fit(g
ED
it ) = pit, ∀t.
which contradicts (18). 
D. Proof of Proposition 2
TLMP for demand dˆt is same as LMP; it is defined by the
marginal cost of serving dˆt:
piTLMP0t :=
∂
∂dˆt
F (GED) = λ∗t .
To compute TLMP for generator i in interval t, consider the
modified multi-interval economic dispatch with generator i
in interval t fixed at the optimal economic dispatch level,
git = g
ED
it :
G′ : minimize
{G=[gjk,(j,k) 6=(i,t)]}
Fit(G)
subject to for all j 6= i and t′ ∈ H r {t}
λit′ :
N∑
j 6=i
gjt′ = dt′
(γ
jt′
, γ¯jt′) : 0 ≤ gjt′ ≤ g¯j,
(η
jt′
, η¯jt′) : −rj ≤ gj(t′+1) − gjt′ ≤ r¯j ,
λit :
N∑
j 6=i
gjt = dt − g
ED
it
(η
it
, η¯it) : −ri ≤ gi(t+1) − g
ED
it ≤ r¯i,
(η
i(t−1)
, η¯i(t−1)) : −ri ≤ g
ED
it − gi(t−1) ≤ r¯i.
(19)
By the envelope theorem, at the optimal solution G∗ = [g∗it]
and (γ∗
it
, γ¯′
∗
it, η
′∗
it
, η¯′
∗
it) of G
′
to
, we have
−
∂
∂g∗it
Fit(G
∗) = λ∗it +∆η
∗
it −∆η
∗
i(t−1)
= λ∗t +∆
∗
it,
where, for the last equality, we have λ∗it = λ
∗
t , η
∗
it = µ
∗
it at
the optimal dispatch defined in (3). 
E. Proof of Theorem 3
We first show that (GED, (piTLMPi )) satisfies the general
equilibrium conditions. Again, we only need to check the
individual rationality condition since the economic dispatch
GED already satisfies the market clearing condition as well as
all the ramping constraints.
For the individual rationality condition, we consider the
optimization G˜i (16) with pi = pi
TLMP. Setting η = η¯ = 0 and
∆ζ = ∆ρ∗i , by the KKT condition, g
ED
i is a solution of G˜i.
Thus (piTLMPi ,g
ED
i ) satisfies the individual rationality condition
for all i. 
To show that (GED, (piTLMPi )) also satisfies the strong equi-
librium condition, we note that (GED, η¯i = ηi = 0, ρ¯
∗
i ,ρ
∗
i
)
is a solution of (16). Because the dual variables for ramping
constraints are all zero, the multi-interval optimization de-
couples in time under piTLMPi . We have q
ED
it as a solution of (5)
for individual rationality.
To show the revenue adequacy for the operator, we com-
pute the merchandising surplus under TLMP. From (15),
MS = d⊺λLMP −
∑
i
(λLMP −A⊺∆µ∗i )
⊺gEDi
=
∑
i
(∆µ∗i )
⊺AgEDi
=
∑
r¯
⊺
i µ¯
∗
i + r
⊺
i µ
∗
i
≥ 0,
where the last equality comes from the complementary
slackness condition. 
F. Proof of Theorem 4
Within this proof, we will focus on a particular generator,
say generator i. For brevity, we drop the subscript i of all
variables associated with generator i.
Let gR-ED = (gR-ED1 , · · · , g
R-ED
T ) be the rolling-window eco-
nomic dispatch over H and piR-TLMP = (piR-TLMP1 , · · · , pi
R-TLMP
T )
the rolling-window TLMP vector.
Let gEDt be the W -window economic dispatch at time t
over Ht from (12) based on dt = (dt1, · · · , dtW ). Note
that dt1 = dt, the actual demand for interval t, and the rest
of entries of dt are forecasts with errors. Let pi
TLMP
t be the
corresponding TLMP vector given in (9).
From the proof of Theorem 3 (with T = W ), the profit
maximization,
G˜t : minimize
g=(g1,··· ,gW )
(ft(g) − g
⊺piTLMPt )
subject to (η, η¯) : − rt ≤ Ag ≤ r¯t,
(ζ, ζ¯) : 0 ≤ g ≤ g¯t,
(20)
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has a solution gEDt with η = η¯ = 0, where ft(g) is the
generation cost over Ht. This means that g
ED
t is a solution
of the ramp-unconstrained optimization
gEDt = arg min
0≤g≤g¯t
(f(g)− g⊺piTLMPt ).
By the rolling-window dispatch and pricing policies, the first
entry of gEDt is g
R-ED
t —the dispatch that is implemented in
interval t—and the first entry of piTLMPt is the the rolling-
window price piR-TLMPt in interval t. We thus have
gR-EDt = arg min
0≤g≤g¯
(ft(g)− gpi
R-TLMP
t ), (21)
which implies that gR-ED is the solution of the ramp-
unconstrained optimization
gR-ED = arg min
0≤g≤g¯
(f(g)− g⊺piR-TLMP).
Let g∗ be the solution of the (ramp-constrained) LOC opti-
mization (16) with pi = piR-TLMP, we must have
f(gR-ED)− (gR-ED)⊺piR-TLMP ≤ f(g∗)− (g∗)⊺piR-TLMP.
Note, however, that gR-ED satisfies all the constraints in (16),
the above inequality holds with equality, and gR-ED is a
solution of (16). Therefore, LOC(gR-ED, piR-TLMP) = 0.
By Proposition 1, (GR-ED,ΠR-TLMP) is a general equilibrium.
From (21), we conclude that (GR-ED,ΠR-TLMP) also satisfies the
strong equilibrium conditions. 
G. On the validity of assumptions in Theorem 2
We present empirical test results on how frequently as-
sumptions in Theorem 2 of Part I hold. To this end,we used
the ISO-NE’s 8-zone systems, shown in the left panel of
Fig. 2 [35]. Parameters of transmission lines and the 76
benchmark generators in ISO-NE 8-zone systems came from
[36], including generation capacities, generation costs, ramp-
ing limits, network topologies, transmission line capacities,
and transmission line reactances.
Transmission Line
Zone Tag
Abbreviation
Zone name
Fig. 2: Left: ISO-NE system. Right: Load scenarios at NE
Mass & Boston.
Based on ISONE load data profile in [35] [36], 5000
load scenarios over 24 hours were generated with normalized
standard deviation 4% in this Monte Carlo simulation, which
is shown in the right panel of Fig. 2. Because these 76 gen-
erators had a combined installed generation capacity account
for 72% of the actual ISO-NE capacity [35], we decreased
the load demand to 72% based on the actual demand data.
Among the 5000 test scenarios, 4927 (98.54%) were found
to satisfied both assumptions of Theorem 2.
